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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL STATE BANK, a Utah 
corporation, FARMERS S T A T E 
BANK, a Utah Corporation, SOUTH 
DAVIS SECURITY BANK, a Utah 
corporation, and DA VIS COUNTY 
BANK, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
VS. 
W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSION-
ER OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
and WALKER BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation. 
Def end ants and Respondents. 
Case No. 11807 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County by plaintiffs Bountiful State Bank, 
Farmers State Bank, South Davis Security Bank and Davis 
County Bank against W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, and Walker 
Bank & Trust Company, for review of a decision of the 
2 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions granting an appli-
cation of Walker Bank & Trust Company for permission 
to establish a branch bank in Centerville, Davis County. 
A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order of 
the Commissioner is appended hereto. The review is 
authorized by Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant Walker Bank & Trust Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was granted by Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson in a Memorandum Decision dated July 18, 
1969 ( R. 41 ) , and thereafter Summary Judgment was 
entered on July 29, 1969 (R. 46-4 7). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
Court reversed and an Order entered setting aside the 
Commissioner's Order, or in the alternative, reinstatement 
of the action in the Court below with direction to enter 
such Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Walker Bank & Trust Company (here-
after "Walker Bank") filed its application for permission 
to establish a bank branch in the vicinity of 1000 South 
and Street. Centerville, Davis County, on May 21, 
1968. Timely written protests were filed by appellants 
( R. 5 7-67) ancl a public hearing" ;1s hdcl by the respond-
ent Commission<"r of Financial Institutions (hereafter re-
ferred to as the "Commissioner") . The hearing was con-
cluded September 30. 1968. 
As Davis County docs not contain a city of the first 
class (Commissioner's Finding No. 8) a branch bank may, 
by statute, only be established in that county in a city or 
town which does not contain a bank as opposed to a 
branch bank (Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended). 
The site of respondent \Valker Bank's proposed branch is 
within the city limits of Centerville in which is located a 
branch of appellant Bountiful State Bank but in which no 
unit bank is situated. The proposed site, however, is lo-
cated away from the business and population center of 
Centerville near the corporate limits of Bountiful, Davis 
County, which city does contain banks as opposed to 
branches and is directly between the main office of ap-
pellant Bountiful State Bank and its Centerville branch, 
being less than one-half mile from the latter (Exhibit V). 
It is undisputed that the existing banks in the area of 
the proposed branch are offering adequate banking service 
( R. 69, 4 72). Because of the nature of Centerville as a 
"bedroom" for Salt Lake City, the banking activity in that 
area is not of the magnitude that might be expected for 
the population present ( R. 440-41 ) . Significantly, how-
ever, a survey conducted of the area by Dr. Milton P. 
Matthews, a highly qualified expert (Exhibit A) called 
by appellants at the hearing before the Commissioner 
showed that although 21.3 percent of the families surveyed 
had their main checking accounts in banks outside of 
South Davis County and 28.6 percent of their second 
checking accounts outside of that area (Exhibit G) none 
of the 100 Centerville families surveyed, which constituted 
a fair statistical sample of Centerville residents (R. 436), 
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banked outside of the area because of any inadequacies in 
the service rendered by the existing banks (R. 438). 
Feeling aggrieved by the Commissioner's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions and Order dated February 28, 1969, 
appellants instituted the subject suit as provided under 
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and following 
entry of the lower court's Summary Judgment this appeal 
is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE DECISION OF THE COM-
MISSIONER ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY 
IGNORED THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED 
BRANCH UPON THE OPERATIONS OF BOUNTI-
FUL ST ATE BANK, IT MUST BE SET ASIDE. 
The Utah branch banking statute provides as follows: 
The business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house and every bank shall re-
ceive deposits and pay checks only at its banking 
house except as hereinafter provided. 
With the consent of the bank commissioner 
any bank having a paid-in capital and surplus of 
not less than $60,000 may establish and operate 
one branch for the transaction of its business; pro-
vided, that for each additional branch established 
there shall be paid in an additional $60,000 ( capi-
tal and surplus) . 
All banking houses and branches shall be lo-
cated either within the corporate limits of a city 
or town, or within unincorporated areas of a 
county in which a city of the first class is located. 
Except in cities of the first class, or within 
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unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or t0\\11 in which is lo-
cated a bank or banks, state or national, regularly 
transacting a customary banking business, unless 
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take 
over an existing bank. No unit bank organized and 
operating at a point where there are other operat-
ing banks, state or national, shall be permitted to 
be acquired by another bank for the purpose of 
establishing a branch until such bank shall have 
been in operation as such for a period of five years. 
The term "branch" as used in this act shall be 
held to include any branch bank, branch office, 
branch agency, additional office, or any branch 
place of business at which deposits are received or 
checks paid or money lent. 
Any bank desiring to establish one or more 
branches or offices shall file a written application 
therefor in such form and containing such infor-
mation as the bank commissioner may reasonably 
require. No bank shall be permitted to establish 
any branch or office until it shall first havr been 
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner 
that the public convenience and advantage will be 
subserved and promoted by the establishment of 
such branch or office. The bank commissioner may, 
at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any ap-
plication to establish a branch. He shall give notice 
of such hearing by publication in three successive 
issues in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county in which the branch is to be established. 
The decision of the bank commissioner granting or 
denying an application to establish a branch shall 
be in writing, state the reasons therefor. and shall 
be mailed to the applicant and all protestants. 
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The bank. commissioner may by order permitting 
the of such branch or office desig-
nate and hm1t the character of work and service 
which may therein be performed. 
No branch shall be established at a location 
outside the corporate limits of a city or town in 
such close proximity to an established bank or 
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the busi-
ness thereof. 
Any corporation or officer thereof violating 
any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended (emphasis 
supplied). 
The proposed site of respondent Walker Bank's 
branch is directly between the principal banking house of 
appellant Bountiful State Bank and its Centerville branch 
(Exhibit V), and within one-half mile of Bountiful State 
Bank's Centerville branch (R. 383) and is so located, or 
would be so located, that substantially all customer traf-
fic directed to appellant's Centerville branch, which is 
located in downtown Centerville, from the south must pass 
by or near the proposed branch ( R. 194). 
This intrusion between two of the banking offices of 
protestant Bountiful State Bank is a factor which must be 
considered in determining the public convenience and 
advantage if the effect of the proposed branch would be 
to unreasonably interfere with existing operations. This 
is especially the case in view of the general banking pro-
vision which provides that the Commissioner 
... may refuse to grant his approval ... when 
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the. location or fi:IcI of operation of the proposed 
busmess shall be m such close proximitv to an es-
tablished business subject to this title· that such 
establishcd business might be unreasonablv inter-
fered with . . . · 
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Respondent's proposed branch would sirrnificantlv in-. 
terfcre with the operation of the existing Centerville 
branch. 
:r-.fr. L. C. Jeppsen, President of Bountiful State 
Bank ( R. 3 79), testified that 90 percent of the savings 
deposits and 83 percent of the checking deposits in dollar 
volume of the Centerville branch of Bountiful State Bank 
are from depositors who reside in Centerville ( R. 382) 
which means that the greater bulk of that branch's 
customers reside within one-half mile of the branch (R. 
383). He further testified that the Centerville branch, 
which had been in operation for about six years, had 
been disappointing in its growth (R. 391). Indeed, the 
during the first several years was nominal and 
later growth has been at an even lesser annual rate. (R. 
381). He testified that because of the natural loss in ac-
counts that would result from the introduction of the 
proposed branch (R. 401) and because of the advertising 
of respondent Walker Bank ( R. 397) that the overall 
impact of the opening of the proposed branch upon the 
Bountiful State Centetville branch would be disastrous 
(R. 383), that future growth of the branch would be 
crippled (R. 397, 401) and that the main bank would 
have to continue the burden of carrying the unprofitable 
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branch ( R. 388) . This testimony is supported by the ex-
perience of appellant Davis County Bank upon the open-
ing of Bountiful State Bank's Centerville branch ( stipu-
lated testimony of Ezra T. Clark, President of appellant 
Davis County Bank ( R. 469-70) ) . 
From the above it is submitted that the Commis-
sioner's order must be set aside as a matter of law on the 
ground that the proposed branch's interference with the 
existing branch precludes a finding that the public con-
venience and advantage would be subserved thereby. 
Even if the evidence does not preclude an order in 
respondent Walker Bank's favor the Commissioner's order 
should still be set aside. The only consideration given by 
the Commissioner to this grim outlook for appellant Boun-
tiful State Bank's branch was his finding that the stability 
of the existing banks would not be jeopardized (Finding 
No. 11) and his conclusion that there would not be un-
reasonable interference with operations or jeopardy to the 
depositors of the existing banks (Conclusion No. 3). This 
clearly indicates that the Commissioner is applying the 
standard suggested by respondent Walker Bank (R. 473-
74, 484-86) that he need consider only the safety of the 
existing banks and the protection of their depositors and 
that he has not considered the healthy and profitable 
opera ti on of the exising banks as is required in determin-
ing the public convenience and advantage and for this 
failure to employ the proper standard of convenience and 
advantage, the Commissioner's Order should be set aside 
with instructions to him at a new hearing on this matter 
to consider the impact of the operation of the proposed 
branch upon the existing branch bank and existing unit 
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banks and the effect of the proposed branch on the exist-
ing branch and banks insofar as such operation must be 
inquired into to determine the public com·enience and 
advantage. 
II. BECAUSE THE C0:\11\llSSIONER FAILED 
TO CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AND CON-
CLCSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL 
ISSUES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF 
THE PROPOSED BRANCH AND THE IMPACT OF 
THE PROPOSED BRANCH ON BOUNTIFUL 
STATE BANK'S EXISTING BRANCH, HIS DECI-
SION l\1UST BE SET ASIDE. 
Fair treatment requires that appellants be accorded 
opportunity for judicial review of the Commissioner's de-
cision, and the right to review has been codified by Sec-
tion 7-1-26 ( 4), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The scope of 
that review has also been set forth by the legislature in 
that section, which provides that the "reviewing court 
shall have power to hold unlawful and set aside any act, 
decision or ruling of the bank commissioner found to be 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law." 
To provide meaningful judicial review, giving sub-
stance to appellants' rights in this case, there is a require-
ment that appellants be permitted to participate in a fair 
hearing and that thereafter the Commissioner make find-
ings conclusions setting forth the facts upon which 
he relied and articulating the bases of his decision. In the 
absence of such hearings, findings and conclusions there 
is nothing upon which to base appellate review, or as 
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stated by the Court in Zion's First National Bank v. 
Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239 at page 241: 
... we arc of the opinion that a public hear-
ing should be had in most, if not all, branch bank 
applications. This is particularly true where a pro-
test has been filed and there is a possibility of a 
court review. Had such hearing been held in the 
instant case, there would probably be an adequate 
record for a court to review. As it is, the record 
contains only the application and letter of First 
Security, Zion's letter of protest, the report of the 
examiner, and a copy of the certificate. Further-
more, while we realize that it is appropriate and 
perhaps necessary for the Commissioner to make 
ex parte investigations to aid him in making his 
decision, the instant case is complicated by the fact 
that he did not prepare any written findings or 
reasons to support his action. The recitation in the 
certificate that First Security "has complied with 
all the provisions of Section 7-3-6" does not supply 
this deficiency. 
Here there is no lack of public hearing, but there is 
glaring absence of "written findings or reasons to support 
his action." 
The branch operations of banks within the State of 
Utah are governed by a scheme which is prohibitory and 
restrictive in nature, as appears from reading the principal 
branching statute, set forth at page 4, supra, and Sec-
tion 7-3-6.3, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which provides 
that: 
From and after the effective date of this act 
no unit bank and no branch bank shall be estab-
lished or authorized to conduct a banking business 
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except as hercinbcfore m section 7-3-6 expressly 
provided. 
and this court has so held in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 236-37. 
It is apparent that the legislature has intended that 
banking competition in a city or town which contains a 
unit bank and which is located in a county which docs not 
contain a city of the first class must be limited to competi-
tion from new unit banks and that no competition may be 
permitted through the entry of branch banks into the city. 
The purpose of this limitation appears to be for the pro-
tection of the established unit banks, or as was stated by 
the Court in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra, 
at 237: 
In 1911, the legislature enacted a statute 
which absolutely prohibited branch banking. It 
was not until 1933 that the legislature relaxed this 
prohibition and permitted branching under certain 
conditions and circumstances. During the period 
between 1911 and 1933 the legislature evidently 
was of the opinion that branch banking ,.,·as not in 
the public interest, possibly because it might im-
pair the stability of the existing banks. This reason-
ing could well have influenced the law makers 
when they saw fit to allow branch banking, but 
only under certain restrictive conditions. [footnotes 
omitted] 
As Centerville does not have located within its cor-
porate limits a unit bank, the Commissioner may permit 
the opening of a branch bank within that city if he finds 
that the public convenience and advantage will be sub-
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served thereby, but he cannot permit the openmg of a 
branch bank in the city of Bountiful. 
One of the issues presented to the Commissioner is 
\-vhethcr he should, or could approve the application when 
the obvious design of the application is to compete in 
Bountiful, but the technical corporate location of the 
branch is within the city of Centerville. The proposed site 
of respondent Walker Bank's application is located at the 
edge of the city of Centerville, directly adjacent to the 
city limits of Bountiful, as appears from examination of 
Exhibit V. This location is a\'\'ay from the residential and 
business center of Centerville, as can be seen through 
examination of Exhibits B through F, and U, in conjunc-
tion with the testimony of Dr. l\1atthews (R. 421-23), 
and it also appears that any logical expansion of the city 
of Centerville will be to the north ( R. 425) rather than 
southward toward the city of Bountiful. Indeed, there 
would appear no need for a second branch bank in the 
city of Centerville in view of its 1967 population as esti-
mated by respondent Walker Bank of only 3,434 (Exhibit 
1, p. 20) .1 
1The obvious and clear deduction from this physical evidence is 
that the intent of respondent Walker Bank in filing its Application is 
to compete in the Bountiful area rather than within the city of Cen-
terville. This obvious deduction is confirmed by the testimony of 
respondent Walker Bank's witness at the hearing before the Com-
missioner. Mr. Robert E. Roll testified at that hearing that he felt 
the propoer location for the branch would be in a proposed shopping 
center located within the city of Bountiful: 
Q. [Mr. Moyle] At what time were you first con-
sulted as to the establishment of a branch bank in Davis 
County? 
At the administrative hearing, respondent \\'alker 
Bank took the position that its branch \\·as to sen-c the 
entirety of South Da\"is Countv and onlv incidentalh Ccn-. , ' 
tcn,illc and that so long as their proposed branch bank 
was to be located \\"ithin the corporate limits of Center-
ville, the Commissioner could not deny the application 
Footnote, 1011ti1111ed 
:\. [ !\ 1 r. Roll] If I may be so hold, I saw this article 
that wP talkC'd about C'arliPr this tl'n million 
dollar shopping CC'lltl'r for PPnnq·s in Bountiful then· and at 
that point I approadwd managcml'nt and said. "I think this 
would he a good plact' for a branch bank." Thl'y said. "Why 
don't you run somt' preliminary figures on it and see what 
you come up with?" 
Q. [Mr. Moyle] Let's make it clear. Then you made 
this suggestion after you read about the Bountiful Shopping 
Center as it appeared in the newspaper? 
A. Roll] Yes. 
(R. 162) 
Q. [Mr. Moyle] All right, your first interest was one 
that you created among yourselves - it may well have been 
other people in the bank were also working along these 
lines, but your first indication was a newspaper article re-
garding the Bountiful Shopping Center and you thought the 
Bountiful Shopping Center might justify a branch bank? 
A. [Mr. Roll] Justify a branch bank, yes. 
(R. 163) 
This preference for Bountiful was confirmed_ b_y testimony 
of 1\,1. D. Borthick, a member of the general adm1mstrat1ve staff of 
respondent Walker Bank (R. 194), who stated the hear-
ing that he would prefer the branch to. be in shopping center 
( R. 232-33), which from the surrounding testimony. of Mr .. Bor-
thick indicates the proposed shopping center located in the city of 
Bountiful. 
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even if the Commissioner determined that the branch was 
established for the purpose of competing in Bountiful or 
other areas outside Centerville and the location was se-
lected solely for the purpose of avoiding legislative policy 
(see, R. 480-84). Appellants took the contrary position 
arguing that under the evidence presented the proposed 
location was contrary to the law and even if not the Com-
missioner had the discretion to deny the application if he 
determined granting the application would defeat the 
legislature's purposes without compensating benefits to the 
to the public (R. 500-01). Despite the presentation of 
evidence and argument as to this material issue, the Com-
missioner's findings and conclusions are silent as to it. 
This silence is in the face not only of appellants' general 
right to review, but the legislative command that the 
Commissioner must give his decision granting or denying 
the application in writing and state the reasons therefor 
(Section 7-3-6, U.C.A.1953, as amended). 
Since the presentation of the subject application to 
the Commissioner this court has decided Walker Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, No. 11628, November 20, 1969, 
____________ Utah 2d ------------, ____ P. 2d ------------, holding that 
in the continguous metropolitan area of Ogden and South 
Ogden a similar "over the line" application by \iValker 
Bank could not be denied on geographical grounds alone 
in that case. This court then limited its holding by stating 
... Nonetheless, it seems to us that geography, 
in a given case, could be some sort of a factor con-
15 
tribuiting to 'public convenience and advantage' 
established 'to the satisfaction' of the 
sioner ... -·-----·---- Utah 2d at ____________ , ---------------· 
P.2d at --------------------· 
The differences between the metropolitan Ogden 
area and the area surrounding respondent's proposed site 
herein are many and obvious. South Ogden and Ogden 
are part of a contiguous and continuous metropolitan area. 
In that area Walker Bank and Trust Company, the largest 
state bank in Utah and a subsidiary of the massive West-
ern Bancorporation holding company (Exhibit Z), was 
attempting to enter an active commercial-industrial area 
in competition with such existing major banks as First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. and Commercial Security 
Bank. Centerville, on the other hand, is a separate and 
distinct residential community (see Exhibits B through F) 
and it and the nearby cities and towns are serviced essen-
tially by local banks, the protestants herein. It is impossible 
for this court because of the Commissioner's failure to 
make findings and conclusions on this issue to determine 
whether the proper standard has been applied. Failure 
of the Commissioner to make findings after issue was 
joined on this issue is ground for setting his order aside. 
The failure of a trial court to make findings on 
material issues is reversible error. 
We pass now to a consideration of the second 
assignment of error, i.e., the failur.e o.f the 
to make findings of fact on certam issues. It IS 
16 
well settled in this jurisdiction that failure to make 
findings of fact on material issues is error, and 
is ordinarily prejudicial. Dillion 9-12 Implement 
Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 P. 670; Holm v. 
Holm, 44 Ctah 242, 139 P. 937; Snyder et al. v. 
Allen et al., 51 Utah 291 ,169 P. 9·Vi; Hall et al v. 
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hat ch, 
70 lTtah 1, 25 7 P. 673; Prows v. H awlcy et al., 
72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 72 Utah 
178, 278 P. 529; Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342; 2 P. 
2d 909; TV est v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 
17 P. 2d 292; Parowan /If ercantile Co. v. Gurr et 
al., 83 Utah 463, 30 P.2d 207; Pike v. Clark, 95 
Utah 235, 79 P.2d 1010. Failure to make findings 
on material issues is not prejudicial, if no find-
ings, other than in support of the judgment would 
have been permissible. Sheppick v. Sheppick et 
al., 44 Utah 131, 137, 138 P. 1169; Snyder v. Allen, 
supra; Piper v. Eakle, supra. And of course fail-
ure to make findings upon immaterial issues, or 
issues which would not affect the judgment of 
the court, is not ground for reversal. Hall et al. 
v. Sabey, supra; Mills v. Gray, 50 Utah 224, 167 
P. 358; Gray v. Def a, 107 Utah 272, 153 P. 2d 544; 
Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah, 363, 145 P.2d 780 .... 
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 269-70. 
The same reasoning which applies to a trial court 
must be even more strongly applicable to the Commis-
sioner of Financial Institutions. In order to determine 
whether the Commissioner's actions were lawful, the 
reviewing court must be aware of the legal standards 
against which the Commissioner measured respondent 
Walker Bank's application. 
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There is no basis other than speculation upon v•hich 
\VC can conclude the reasons for which the Commissioner 
omitted to make findings and conclusions with respect to 
this issue, and under such circumstances. we cannot con-
clude that the Commissioner was not operating under a 
misconception of the applicable law. This must be con-
trasted with the situation which was presented to this 
court in Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall, 
supra, wherein the Commissioner made a specific conclu-
sion as to this issue as set forth in the opinion of Justice 
Ellett, concurring and consenting (concurred in by Chief 
Justice Crockett) permitting the court in its opinion to 
specifically determine the grounds upon which the Com-
missioner acted. 
A situation, similar to the one herein, involving a fail-
ure to make findings and conclusions with respect to a 
principal issue was presented to this court in Salt Lake 
City v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 581. In review-
ing a decision of the Industrial Commission, Chief Justice 
Wolfe, speaking for the court, determined that the Com-
mission had ignored one of the basic issues presented at 
the hearing: 
As already indicated, the finding quoted above 
is subject to a second interpretation. That is, it may 
be construed as relating only to the question of the 
origin of the fight. If .interpretatio.n is. ac-
cepted, then there is no fmdmg on the 
as to whether or not the applicant was actmg m 
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violation of the rule for there is no specific 
fmdmg that he had the permission of foreman or 
assistant foreman to take the screens. Under such 
an interpretation the cast' must be reversed for we 
cannot assume that the Commission, if it had made 
a finding on this issue, \\'ould have resolved the con-
flict in favor of the applicant. 
103 Utah at 587 
and further: 
... The record, when taken as a whole, indi-
cates that the Commission did not consider the 
first aspect of the case, that is, whether the break-
ing of the rule by the applicant for reasons tanta-
mount to being personal to himself itself consti-
tuted a departure. There would, therefore, be no 
logical or reasonable basis for assuming that the 
Commission would have found either one way or 
the other on the conflicting evidence relating 
to the applicant's knowledge of the rule, or, if he 
had knowledge of the rule, that its effect had been 
suspended by permission given to take the screens. 
103 Utah at 588. 
The Court's opinion was later modified at 103 Utah 
595. The Chief Justice there indicated that the case was 
based in part on an indication in the Commission's find-
ings which led the court to believe that had the Commis-
sion considered the issue, they would have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion. In view of the complete absence of find-
ings or conclusions in the instant case touching upon the 
issue of geographic location, the court cannot conclude 
that the Commissioner would have reached a conclusion 
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in favor of respondent \\'alkcr Bank in \·ic\\· of the evi-
dence presented . .Judicial rn·iew of the aclministrati\'e 
hearing can only assure protestants of the enforcement of 
their rights if the re,·iewing court determines that the 
proper legal bases were applied to the facts as presented. 
Had the Commissioner made findings of fact with respect 
to this issue, then it could be determined upon re\'iew if 
the proper standard had been applied or, in the alterna-
tive, if the wrong standard was applied, whether or not 
application of the correct standard would change the re-
sults in view of the facts found. In this instance, however, 
there is no recourse but to set aside the Commissioner's 
order with instructions to him, should a new application 
be made by respondent Walker Bank, to consider the ap-
plication under guidelines set forth by this court in Walker 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, supra, and herein as to the 
legal requirements to be considered. 
The identical reasoning applies to the issue of the 
impact of the proposed branch upon the Centerville 
Branch of Bountiful State Bank. Once again diametric-
ally opposed legal bases were proposed by appellants 
and respondent Walker Bank. The latter argued that the 
profitability of the existing branch and even the prof ita-
bility of Bountiful State Bank taken as a whole was not 
an issue which could be properly considered by the Com-
missioner, that he was limited in his consideration only to 
the determination of whether or not the deposits of the 
public in the bank were secure and whether or not the 
bank could survive (R. 473-74, 484-86). Apellants, on 
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the other hand, argued that profitability of both the 
bank as a whole and its Centerville branch were factors 
to be considered by the Commissioner in determining the 
effect of the proposed branch on the public convenience 
and advantage (R. 501-02). Evidence was squarely pre-
sented on the issue, and the overwhelming evidence sup-
ports the proposition that the proposed branch, if opened, 
would have a disastrous effect upon the operation of 
the existing Centerville branch. Once again, there is a 
complete absence of findings and conclusions by the 
Commissioner as to what legal standard he applied in 
reaching his decision, and it is improper to assume in 
view of the evidence that he would have found in favor of 
respondent Walker Bank had he applied the legal prin-
ciples presented by appellants in Point I above. For the 
benefit of the public and the Commissioner in later appli-
cations of the branch banking statute as well as this, 
it is necessary that the Court set aside the Commission-
er's order with instructions to him as to the legal guide-
lines applicable to branch banking applications. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the 
Order of respondent Commissioner was arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law; that the Court below improperly entered 
Summary Judgment against appellants, and that the de-
cision of the Court below should be reversed and an 
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Order entered herein setting aside the Commissioner's 
Order, and awarding appellants their costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted. 
OSCAR W. JR. 
0. \VOOD MOYLE III 
of Moyle & Moyle 
RENDALL N. MABEY 
of Mabey, Bradford & Marsden 
Attorneys for Appellants 
App. I 
STATE OF UTAH 
Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
Salt Lake City 
In the l\1atter of the Application of 
WALKER BANK & TRl,TST 
p ANY for permission to establish a 
branch bank in the vicinity of 1000 
South and Main Street, Centerville, 





FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on l\1ay 21, 1968, Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany, 175 South :Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
its application for permission to establish a branch 
bank on the vicinity of 1000 South and 1i1ain Street, 
Centerville, Davis County, Utah, using a branch bank 
application form prescribed by the Commissioner. 
2. That the Commissioner had notice of the above ap-
plication mailed to all banks in Davis County and 
others and he had notice of the application published 
in three successive issues of The Salt Lake Tribune, 
a newspaper having general circulation in the Davis 
County, Utah, commencing :May 25, 1968. 
3. That written protests to the granting of this applica-
tion were received from Farmers State Bank, South 
Davis Security Bank, Davis County Bank, Bountiful 
State Bank, Clearfield State Bank, North Davis Bank, 
and Barnes Banking Company. 
4. That the Commissioner called a public hearing for 
consideration of the application to be held in Room 
303, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, at 
App. II 
ten o'clock a.m. on September 25, 1968. He had notice 
of the hearing mailed to all banks located in Davis 
County and others and published notice of the hear-
ing in three successive issues of The Salt Lake Trib-
une, commencing September 6, 1968. The hearing 
was held as noticed and was continued on September 
26 and September 30, 1968, on which latter date it 
was concluded. 
5. That applicant was represented at the hearing by its 
Attorney, H. R. Waldo, Jr., of Jones, Waldo, Hol-
brook & McDonough. Counsel representing protest-
ants at the hearing were: 0. Wood 'Moyle III of 
Moyle & Moyle for Farmers State Bank, Charles E. 
Bradford of Bradford & Forbes for South Davis 
Security Bank, Gordon A. Madsen for Bountiful 
State Bank, Keith L. Stahle for Davis County Bank, 
and Raymond W. Gee for Clearfield State Bank. 
Others who had filed written protests to the applica-
tion were not represented at the hearing. 
6. That the filing of written briefs with the Commis-
sioner was waived by attorneys for both the applicant 
and the protestants who appeared at the hearing and 
no such briefs were filed. 
7. That Walker Bank & Trust Company is one of the 
oldest and largest state chartered banks in the State 
of Utah. Its main office is in Salt Lake City and it 
has twelve branches in Salt Lake County (eleven of 
which arc presently operating) and branches in Price, 
Provo and Logan which are presently operating. 
8. That Centerville is a city of the third class and there 
are no banks (as distinguished from branches of 
banks) located within the city limits of said city. 
There is no city of the first class in Davis County. 
9. That applicant bank has capital and surplus of not 
less than $60,000 for each branch it is presently oper-
App. III 
ating and an additional $60,000 of such capital and 
surplus for the proposed branch (Exhibit 1, page 49). 
10. That the proposed branch would be located on a 
parcel of .land fronting on 1000 South (Pages Lane) 
near the mtersection of that street with Street 
(State Highway No. 106). Such parcel of land is 
located entirely within the city limits of Centerville 
Davis County, Utah. ' 
11. That there are within the city limits of Centerville 
a branch of the Bountiful State Bank but no other 
banks or branches. Other banks or branches in South 
Davis County (that part of Davis County south of 
the Farmington cross-roads - Tr. 26-27), the dates 
such banks or branches were organized or established 
and the distance of such banking facilities from the 
proposed branch of applicant are as shown on page 
59 of Exhibit 1, Table IV-10. All of such banks and 
branches have operated from the locations indicated 
a sufficient period of time to have an established 
business at such locations. All of the banks operating 
in South Davis County are financially stable and se-
cure institutions and such stability would not be 
jeopardized or the interests of the public impaired 
by the establishment and operation of the proposed 
branch. Existing banks have been able to compete 
successfully with other financial institutions and 
South Davis Security Bank, established in May of 
1963, was able to enter the area, become established 
and increase its loans, deposits and resources without 
preventing the other banks in the area from increas-
ing their loans, deposits and resources also (Exhibit 
1, Chapter IV, pp. 42-64; Tr. 254, 260-263, 265-268, 
270-271, 275-276, 301-304, 312-315, 339). Total re-
sources of all South Davis County banks increased 
from $22,600,000 December 31, 1963, which was the 
last year of entry of a new unit bank into the area, to 
$34,250,000 December 31, 1967. 
App. IV 
12. That propos_cd branch would supply the full range 
of bankmg scf\·ices offered hy the applicant bank in 
its other banking offices. including clrin·-in tellers' 
windows, safe-deposit boxes, checking and sa\·ings 
accounts, the \\' alker Bankard (a bank credit card 
sef\·ice), access to the trust department opnations 
of the applicant bank (Tr. 142, 148) and inter-branch 
transactions (Tr. 319-3 20) . 
13. That the applicant bank has a lending limit to any one 
person or corporation of approximately $2,865,000 
(Tr. 77). In the South Davis County area, the 
lending limit of any of the existing banks is approxi-
mately $90,000 (Tr. 77). The ratio of banking facili-
ties to population indicates that there are fewer bank-
ing facilities in the South Davis County area to serve 
population than in the State as a (Exhibit 
1. p. 50; Tr. 80-81, 101-103, 411-412). 
14. That applicant has a number of existing customers 
residing or having officers or places of business in 
South Davis County and Centef\•ille (Tr. 16-24, 86, 
89-90; Exhibit 7). 
15. That the financial condition and history of the ap-
plicant bank and its management demonstrate its 
capacity to successfullv manage and operate the pro-
posed branch. 
16. It appears that the economic effect of the proposed 
branch and its sources of business would include all 
of the Centerville. Farmington Bountiful. \Vest 
Bountiful. \Voods Cross. North Salt Lake. and un-
incorporated areas of South Davis Count\' (Ex. 1, 
pp. 2. 16; Tr. 26-27. 119-121 ) . This area has experi-
enced a substantial growth in recent years. as meas-
surcd bv new (Tr. 72-71). emplo)ment, 
wages. and tax collections (Ex. 1, pp. 16-
18 .. 41; Ex. 8-12; Tr. 126-135. 191-210. 378-380. 399-
App. V 
406). Population has incrca1.,ed substantially (Ex. 1 
pp. 81-83; Tr. l'.!.3-126, ?7-t-:n7, 7) 
and estimates of future population for the area indi-
cate a substantial growth (Ex. 1, pp. 18, 21, 125-126 
309, 354-355, 398). Growth of the economy in 
future is likely to continue (Ex. 1 pp. 18, 29: 33, 40· 
Tr. 72-74, 204, 206-209, 268-270, 275, 309-310, 345)'. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Due notice of the receipt of this application has 
been given as required by law and a hearing was 
held as permitted by law. 
2. The applicant bank has the necessary capital and 
surplus to permit the establishment of an additional 
branch bank. 
3. The Commissioner finds that because of the sub-
stantial economic growth in South Davis County 
in recent years, increased competition from the pro-
posed branch bank would not unreasonably interfere 
with the operation of the existing banks and branches 
which are located in this area. It would not jeopar-
dize the depositors of such banks, would not interfere 
with the abilitv of these banks to maintain their 
financial strength and would not impair their ability 
to compete with the applicant bank and other banks. 
The vitality of this area is demonstrated by new 
industry and building in the area and increases in 
employment, wages, income and sales tax collections. 
Population has increased substantially and is likely 
to continue in the future. In 1967, South Davis 
County had a population per banking office of in 
excess of 7,200 people and the State as a whole had 
a population per banking office at that time of 6,247. 
An additional banking facility to serve this expand-
ing economy would subserve and promote the public 
convenience and advantage. 
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t. The public COil\'cnicnce and .Hh-anta!.!c would be sub-
scn-cd and promoted hy the establishment of the 
proposed branch at the location proposed and there 
is no reason to limit the character of work or scn·icc 
to he performed at such branch. Applicant bank has 
a number of existing custonwrs rcsidin!.! or ha\'ill!.! 
offices in or places of business sen·ing South Da\'is 
Count\' and it would be for the comTnicncc and to 
the advantage of such customers that the proposed 
branch be located in the area. Furthermore. if the 
proposed branch bank is established. the general 
public would be afforded the choice of another bank-
ing facility with substantially larger lending limits 
than any other bank in the area. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, the Commissioner of Financial ln-
stitutiom hereby makes the following 
ORDER 
The application of \Valker Bank & Trust Company 
for permission to establish a branch bank in the City of 
Centerville. Davis County, Utah. in the vicinity of 1000 
Street and Main Street is hereby approved. 
Dated at Salt Lake CitY. l 1tah. this '.!8th day of 
1'1·hruar\'. 1969. 
\V. S. Brimhall. Commissioner 
State Department of Financial 
Institutions 
